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Too Much and Too Little: A Bankruptcy
Balancing Act
Rose v. United States Department ofEducation (In re Rose)'
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a case of too much and too little. It represents one court's attempt
to deal with problems created by too much Congressional guidance in one area
of the Bankruptcy Code and too little guidance in another. In 1994, Congress
revised 11 U.S.C. § 106, adding a provision declaring that when a state files a
claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, it has waived its sovereign immunity as to that
claim.2 Two years later, the United States Supreme Court,.in Seminole Tribe v.
3
Florida,
limited Congress's power to expand Article I judicial powers to the
Eleventh Amendment. The In re Rose court had to determine if Congress went

too far when it enacted 11 U.S.C. § 106(b).
The court also had to deal with too little guidance from Congress: a debtor
seeking to discharge student loans within seven years after they first came due'
must prove that repaying the loans would create an "undue hardship." 6 Courts
have struggled with defining this term, but the growing trend is to adopt the
Brunnertest for undue hardship.7 This case illustrates the amorphous nature of
this test and how it can be used to discharge student loans.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
As part of a Chapter 7 proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Missouri, Jennifer Ruth Rose filed a complaint to
determine the dischargeability of student loans used to finance her undergraduate
and law degrees.8 Rose owed more than $105,000 in student loans to eight

1. 215 B.R. 755 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1994).
3. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
4. See infra note 27 and the accompanying text.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) (1994). In the fall of 1998, Congress amended Section
523(a)(8) with the passage of the Higher Education Amendments of 1998, thereby
eliminating Section 523(a)(8) in its entirety. Higher Education Amendments of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971, 112 Stat. 1581, 1584 (1998). For bankruptcy cases
commenced after October 1, 1998, a student loan that first became due seven years before
the date of the filing of the petition is no longer dischargeable on that basis. See Pub. L.
No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581, 1584 (1998).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1994).
7. See infra notes 50-55 and the accompanying text.
8. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 762-63 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997).
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different defendants. 9 At the time of the bankruptcy, she was employed at a
salary of just over $30,000 per year as a law clerk working for the Jackson
County Associate Circuit Court. 0 Her husband, Michael, was unemployed and
stayed home with the couple's two young children." The couple sought to
discharge the debt under Section 523(a)(8)(B), which allows discharge of a
student loan obligation if excepting the debt would impose an "undue hardship"
on the debtor. 2
The Missouri Student Loan Program (MSLP) was the only defendant still
party to the action who filed a brief contesting the court's jurisdiction on
Eleventh Amendment grounds. 3 The MSLP contended that it was a government
agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection. The MSLP also argued that
by filing a proof of claim against Rose, the state did not agree to have the court
determine whether the claim should be discharged; the Eleventh Amendment
should shield the state from any adverse action against it."
As a preliminary matter, the court determined that Section 106(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code was unconstitutional to the "extent it attempts to dictate the
circumstances constituting a waiver of immunity on the part of a state.' 5 The
court reasoned that Congress had attempted to unconstitutionally abrogate a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity by declaring that filing a proof of claim
constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity.' 6 Despite this constitutional
infirmity, the court found that filing a claim in fact constituted such a waiver
because once the claim was filed, the debtor's attempt to have the debt
discharged was tantamount to a compulsory counterclaim, and the7 state had
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to that counterclaim.
Having determined its jurisdiction to decide the matter, the court addressed
the dischargeability of the student loans under Section 523(a)(8)(B) by applying

9. Id. at 762. The defendants are the United States Department of Education, the
Missouri Coordinating Board for Higher Education, the Missouri Student Loan Program,
HEMAR Insurance Corporation of America, Illinois Guarantors Student Assistance,
Nebraska Student Loan, the University of Missouri and North Star Guarantee. Id. at 766.
North Star Guarantee did not answer the complaint and the court entered a default
judgment against it in favor of Rose. Id. at 757. The University of Missouri filed a
motion to dismiss contending that the action against it was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. The Court granted the motion on that basis November 10, 1997. Rose
v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 214 B.R. 372, 378 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).
10. In reRose, 215 B.R. at 763.
11. Id.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1994).
13. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr.

W.D. Mo. 1997).
14. Id. at 760.
15. Id. at 758.
16. Id. at 758-59.
17. Id. at 762.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/14
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the Brunnertest to determine whether requiring Rose to repay the loans would
constitute an undue hardship."' Although the court expressed some distaste as
to whether a debtor should be allowed to accumulate more than $100,000 in
student loans and then discharge them in a Chapter 7 proceeding, the court
concluded that Rose had satisfied the three-prong Brunner test for undue
hardship and that the debts should be discharged. 19
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. State Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution protects states
from suit in federal court.20 However, there are two exceptions to that
protection: a state may be subject to suit if it waives its right to sovereign
immunity2 or if Congress abrogates that right.22 In 1994, Congress attempted
to abrogate that protection by enacting 11 U.S.C. § 106(b). 23 This section was
added to the Bankruptcy Code to clarify when a compulsory counterclaim may
be brought against a governmental unit, thereby overruling contrary case law
which held that filing a proof of claim did not serve as a prerequisite for finding
a waiver of sovereign immunity.24 The new provision clearly dictates that the

18. Id. at 763. Under the Brunnertest, the debtor must establish (1) that he cannot
maintain a minimal standard of living based on current income and expenses if forced to
repay the loans, (2) that circumstances exist that indicate that the situation will persist for
a significant portion of the repayment period, and (3) that he has made good faith efforts
to repay the student loans. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re
Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
19. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 766 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997).
20. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
21. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
22. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
23. Section 106(b) provides:
A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the case is deemed to
have waived sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against such
governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence out of which the claim of such governmental unit
arose.
11 U.S.C. §106(b) (1994).
24. See NOTES OF COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 95-989 (1995); see also
In re Town & Country Nursing Home Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1992); In re
Operation Open City, Inc., 170 B.R. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re T.F. Stone Cos., 170
B.R. 884 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994); In re Gribben, 158 B.R. 920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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filing of a claim by a state constitutes a waiver of that state's sovereign immunity
as to any compulsory
counterclaim 5 arising from the same transaction or
26
occurrence.
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court called the constitutionality of this
provision into question when it determined that Congress did not have plenary
power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. 7 In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
the Court held that Congress could not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity
under the Indian Commerce Clause found in Article I of the United States
Constitution.28
In Seminole Tribe, the Court noted that in prior decisions, the Court had
found constitutional authority for abrogating state sovereign immunity only
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 9 and the Interstate Commerce
Clause." The Court ultimately held that the Eleventh Amendment restricts
Article I judicial power, and that Article I power may not be used as an end-run
around the constitutional limitations placed on federal court jurisdiction."
Since the Supreme Court's holding in Seminole Tribe, federal courts have
questioned the constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) as an impermissible
congressional abrogation of a state's sovereign immunity. Many courts
confronting the question since the Seminole Tribe decision have sidestepped the
constitutional issue by finding that either the state had waived its sovereign

25. 11 U.S.C. §106(b) (1994).
26. The standards used to identify a compulsory counterclaim under FED. R. CIV.
PRO. 13(a) are used to identify whether a bankruptcy claim is part of the same
"transaction or occurrence." United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34
(1992).
27. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996).
28. Id. at 1131. "Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting states." Id.
29. "The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the
provision of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S.
Ct. 2666 (1976) (holding that Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109
S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (holding that Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity
under the Article I Interstate Commerce Clause), overruledby Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct.
at 1114.
31. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. This effectively overturned the holding
in Union Gas, where the court had found constitutional authority for Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Interstate Commerce Clause. Justice Rehnquist,
in delivering the opinion of the Court in Seminole Tribe, implicitly noted that the holding
could apply to bankruptcy proceedings, but dismissed concern expressed by the dissent
by noting that "[a]lthough the ... bankruptcy laws have existed since our nation's
inception.., there is no established tradition in the lower federal courts of allowing
enforcement of those federal statutes against the states." Id. at 1132 n.16.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/14
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immunity or that Section 106(b) did not apply because no claim was filed by the
state.32 Of the courts directly addressing the issue, at least two have found
Section 106(b) constitutional.33 At least five courts, however, including the Rose
court, have found 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) unconstitutional on the basis that Congress
may not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity using Article I powers.34
Regardless of the constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. § 106(b), courts on both sides
of the issue have been
willing to find a waiver of sovereign immunity if a state
35
entity files a claim.

B. Undue Hardship
In 1976, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to make student loans
in the Chapter 7 context nondischargeable. 5 This provision was repealed by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which incorporated the earlier provisions into
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 37 In 1990, Congress extended the prohibition against

32. See AER-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Transp. (In re AER-Aerotron), 104
F.3d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 1997); In re ABEPP Acquisition Corp., 215 B.R. 513, 518 (6th
Cir. 1997); In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 204 B.R. 132, 141 (E.D. Pa. 1997), affid, 133 F.3d
237 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Lazar, 200 B.R. 358 (C.D. Cal. 1996); In re William Ross, Inc.,
199 B.R. 551, 555 (W.D. Pa. 1996); In re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225, 229 (D.P.R. 1996);
In re Koehler, 204 B.R. 210,219 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997); In re Stoecker, 202 B.R. 429,
448 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), affd, 1998 WL 644363 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998).
33. See In re Straight, 209 B.R. 540 (D. Wyo. 1997) (holding that Section 106(b)
was constitutional in that Congress intended to provide debtors with all the privileges and
immunities provided by the Bankruptcy Code, thereby tying Congress's Article I
Bankruptcy powers to the Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998);
In re Charter Oak, 203 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) (holding that Section 106(b)
is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Seminole Tribe).
34. See In re Creative Goldsmiths, Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied sub. nom. Schlussberg v. Maryland Comptroller of Treasury, 118 S. Ct. 1517
(1998); In re C.J. Rogers, Inc., 212 B.R. 265,273 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Value Added
Communications, Inc., 216 B.R. 547,549 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997); In reNVRL.P., 206
B.R. 831, 837 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd sub. nom. Clerk of the Circuit Court v. NVR

Homes, Inc., 222 B.R. 514 (E.D. Va. 1998).
35. See In re AER-Aerotron, 104 F.3d at 681; In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F.3d 1147,
1152 n.6 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Fennelly, 212 B.R. 61, 64 (D.N.J. 1997); In re Straight,
209 B.R. at 555-58; In re Lazar, 200 B.R. at 379; In re Martinez, 196 B.R. at 229-30; In
re Lush Lawns, Inc., 203 B.R- 418,421 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); In re York-Hannover
Devs., Inc., 201 B.R. 137, 142 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996); In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 199
B.R. 129, 135 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 204 B.R. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1997), affid, 133
F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 1998).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (repealed 1978).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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discharge to debtors filing a Chapter 13"8 and extended the period for which 39a
loan is nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(8)(A) from five to seven years.

Despite these various iterations of the law, Congress has never defined the

term "undue hardship"
as used in Section 523(a)(8)(B). This task has been left
to the courts, 40 and those courts addressing the issue have used five different
approaches to define the term.4' Some courts define the term based on the facts
and circumstances of the case.42 Others rely on the suggested four-factor test in
the 1973 Report of the Bankruptcy Commission to determine what constitutes
undue hardship.43
Three cases have been significant in the judiciary's attempt to define undue
hardship and these cases have resulted in three different tests. In re Johnson4

38. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (1994).
39. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621(2) (1990). This provision has since been
repealed. See supra note 5.
40. Courts generally recognize that defining the term is within their discretion. See
In re Ipsen, 149 B.R. 583, 585 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); In re Johnson, 121 B.R. 91, 93
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
41. See Craig A. Gargotta, Undue Hardship and the DischargeofStudent Loans,
15 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10 (1996). Gargotta identifies four approaches used by the
courts. Id. The fifth is an undefined approach relying on the facts and circumstances of
the case. See Patricia Somers & James M. Hollis, Student Loan Discharge Through
Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 457,479-80 (1996).
42. See Somers & Hollis, supra note 41, at 479.
43. See Gargotta, supra note 41, at 10. The factors are (1) if the debtor has or will
beable to accumulate wealth, (2) the debtor's employment and expected income, (3) the
income required for the debtor to maintain a minimum standard of living, and (4) the
existence of any income that would allow the debtor to repay the student loan while
maintaining a minimum standard of living. See Gargotta, supra note 41, at 10.
44. 5 B.C.D 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/14
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gave rise to the Johnson test,45 In re Bryant46 produced the Bryant test,4 7 and In
49
re Brunner" resulted in the Brunner test.
The Brunnertest is perhaps the most widely used test for undue hardship."0
It has been formally adopted as the test in the Second," Third, 2 and Seventh 3
Circuits. The Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted the Brunner test but has
implicitly made it the test in that circuit.5 4 One commentator notes that eleven
of the thirteen circuit courts either explicitly or implicitly apply the test. 5
Although the Eighth Circuit has not formally adopted the Brunner test in
any reported cases, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouris7
has used it as the test for undue hardship since at least 1992.56 The In re Ipsen
court announced that it used the Brunner test to determine whether a debtor's

45. The Johnson test is made up of a mechanical test, a good faith test and a policy
test. Id. at 539-42. Under the mechanical test, the court examines the debtor's income
to determine whether he could live at subsistence or poverty level while repaying the
loans. Id. at 544. In applying the good faith test, the court determined whether there was
a good faith effort to repay the educational loan. Id. at 540. Even if the debtor fails the
first two prongs, he may be entitled to a discharge under the policy test. Id. at 542-43.
Under the policy test, the court determines whether the primary reason for filing the

bankruptcy was to discharge the student loans and whether the debtor benefitted
financially from the education. Id. at 544. If the answer to both questions is no, then the
debt may be discharged. Id.
46. 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). Note that this is the same court that
formulated the Johnson test, but later refused to enforce it because it was too
complicated. Id. at 915 n.2.
47. The Bryant test relies on federal poverty guidelines to determine
dischargeability. Id. at 914. If a debtor's net income does not "substantially" exceed the
federal poverty level guidelines, the debt may be discharged. Id.
48. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
49. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
50. Jeffrey L. Zackerman, Note, DischargingStudent Loans in Bankruptcy: The
Needfor a Uniform "Undue Hardship" Test, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 691, 712 (1997).
51. See Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Sevs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831
F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
52. See In re Faish, 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1009
(1996).
53. See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993).
54. See In re Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1081 (1995). It has subsequently been applied as the test in the circuit. See In re
Dolph, 215 B.R. 832 (6th Cir. 1998); In re Rice, 78 F.3d 1144 (6th Cir. 1996).
55. Zackerman, supranote 50, at 721 n.256.
56. See In re Ipsen, 149 B.R. 583 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992). In re Cardwell cited
to Brunner, noting that the court should look at the long-term prospects of the debtor
when deciding undue hardship. In re Cardwell, 95 B.R. 121,122 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1989). However, the court did not formally announce it as the test it followed nor does
the reference rise to the level of a tacit adoption. Id.
57. 149 B.R. 583 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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circumstances would create an undue hardship if student loan debts were
excepted from discharge.5 8 The court held that K'Lynn Ipsen did not satisfy the
first prong of the Brunnertest because her husband provided for her housing and
because her former husband provided other assistance which allowed her to
maintain a minimal standard of living. 9 The court also found that she failed the
second prong of the test because she did not establish an inability to pay the loan
over the long-term, even though she was not able'to find a full-time job using the
skills her60education provided her and even though she was scheduled for major
surgery.
The court also applied the test to Chapter 7 debtors seeking to discharge
more than $35,000 in student loans. 6' The court determined that Jon Wardlow's
$10,000 loans were dischargeable pursuant to "11 U.S.C. § 535(a)(8)(A)" [sic]
because they first became due more than seven years before the petition was
filed. 62 Renette Wardlow's debt was held to be nondischargeable because the
couple failed to satisfy the first two prongs of the Brunner test.6 3 The court
found that the couple could maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to
repay the loans," and that there were no circumstances indicating a likelihood
that the debtors would not be able to repay the loans for a significant portion of
the repayment period.65
In 1994, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri began
to find that debtors could satisfy the three-prong test. For example, in In re

O'Brien the court held that Chronic Fatigue Syndrome prevented a Chapter 7
debtor from repaying her student loans.6 The court held that the condition was
likely to persist for a significant portion of the loan repayment period, that the
and that she did not
circumstances of her illness were beyond her control,
67
willfully or negligently contribute to her default.
In March 1997, the court discharged $12,736.64 in student loans for a
Chapter 7 debtor even though her income exceeded her listed expenses by more

58. Id. at 585.
59. Id. at 585-86.
60. Id. at 586.
61. In re Wardlow, 167 B.R. 148, 149-150 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993).
62. Id. at 150-51.
63. Id. at 152.

64. Id. at 151. The court noted telephone, cable, recreation and miscellaneous
expenses indicating that the debtors were "maintaining more than a minimal standard of
living." Id.
65. Id. at 152. The court said despite child care expenses, recurrent ear infections
in the children and Renette Wardlow's anxiety attacks and stress related problems, no
long-term circumstances existed that would satisfy the second prong of the Brunner test.
Id. at 151-52.
66. In re O'Brien, 165 B.R. 456,460 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
67. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/14
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than $200 a month.68 The court found that the debtor lived frugally and could69
not maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay her loans.
Furthermore, the court noted that her age and lack of experience made it unlikely
that she would be able to improve her circumstances." The court found that the

third prong was satisfied inthat the debtor continued to try to find a better paying
job, lived frugally, and testified that she had made some payments on her student
loan.7

In the most recent reported case prior to In re Rose, the Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Missouri applied the Brunner test and discharged
more than $100,000 in student loan debt for a Chapter 7 debtor who had used the
money to obtain an advanced management degree.' In this case, the debtor was
unable to keep ajob commensurate with her education for an extended period.73
Furthermore, she was facing felony charges for removing her children from the
state of Missouri to California in direct violation of a court order. 74 The court
found that the debtor's circumstances satisfied the first two prongs of the
Brunnertest75 and that, although she had not been able to pay back any of her
student loans, she had used her best efforts to obtain employment, maximize her
income, and minimize her expenses. 76 These decisions laid the foundation for
the holding of In re Rose.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Because the issue was jurisdictional, the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Missouri initially addressed whether the MSLP had
waived the state's sovereign immunity under Section 106(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code by submitting a claim for the student loan that Jennifer Rose owed to the
state.77 The court determined that Section 106(b) was "unconstitutional to the
the circumstances constituting a waiver of immunity
extent it attempts to dictate
7
on the part of the state.'

68. In re Dotson-Cannon, 206 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997). The court
"found" an additional $400 a month in expenses to help her satisfy the first prong of the
Brunnertest. Id. at 533-34.
69. Id. at 534.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 535.
72. In re Clevenger, 212 B.R. 139 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).
73. Id. at 142-43.
74. Id. at 141.
75. Id. at 145.
76. Id. at 146.
77. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997).
78. Id. at 758.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Relying heavily on In re NVR L.P. 79 and In re C.J.Rogers, Inc.,"0 the court
reasoned that only a state can waive its own sovereign immunity and Congress
cannot determine when such a waiver occurs. 8' In addition, the court concluded
that no provision of Article I of the U.S. Constitution gave Congress the power

to abrogate the state's sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy context.82 The
court reasoned that Congress did not act in accordance with valid constitutional

power when it enacted Section 106(b) and, as a result, Section 106(b) was
unconstitutional. Although Congress had unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in Section 106(b),83 it could not

constitutionally do so.84
Despite that conclusion, the court continued its inquiry. Although Section

106(b) was unconstitutional, the statute "may have correctly described those
actions which, as a matter of constitutional law, constitute a state's waiver of the

Eleventh Amendment."85 The court first noted that constructive waiver of the
Eleventh Amendment is generally not recognized and that a waiver must be
"unequivocally expressed."8 6 The court also recognized that the State of

Missouri had not waived its sovereign immunity by legislation nor intervened as
a plaintiff in the case; therefore, case law was instructive on the issue.87 The
court relied on a 1947 Supreme Court decision which defined when a waiver of

sovereign immunity occurs in bankruptcy proceedings.88 Based on the reasoning

expressed in Gardnerv. New Jersey,89 MSLP, in filing a claim, had waived its

sovereign immunity as to that claim. 90 Furthermore, the court reasoned that it

79. 206 B.R. 831 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
80. 212 B.R. 265 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
81. In reRose, 215 B.R. at 758-59.
82. Id. at 759. Congress may abrogate a state's right to sovereign immunity only
if the abrogation is unequivocally expressed and if Congress is acting according to a
valid constitutional power. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123 (1996)
(citing Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423, 426 (1985)).
83. The Rose court found that the language of Section 106(b) dictating when a state
waived its sovereign immunity was an "attempted abrogation." Rose v. United States
Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 759 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (citing In re
NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 839 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1997)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 759 (citing In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. A state waives its sovereign immunity when it files a claim against the
bankruptcy estate because "he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering
a proof of claim and demanding its allowance must abide the consequences of that
procedure." Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1947).
89. 329 U.S. 565 (1947).
90. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 760 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997).
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would be fundamentally unfair to allow the state to file a claim and then preclude
the debtor from asserting any valid defenses to that claim.9 The court concluded
that, from an equity standpoint, MSLP could not have it "both ways;" 92 the filing
of the claim was a valid waiver of the state's sovereign immunity as to the
claim.93
Having established jurisdiction over the loan, the court turned to the issue
of whether Rose's student loans were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8)(B), which allows for discharge of a student loan if excepting the debt
from discharge would impose undue hardship on the debtor. 94 Noting that the
Bankruptcy Code does not define "undue hardship," the court stated that
determining undue hardship was discretionary. 95 Furthermore, the court utilized
the Brunner test to determine whether such a hardship existed.96
In determining whether Rose could maintain a minimal standard of living
if forced to repay the loan,97 the court detailed Rose's income and expenses,
showing that she had monthly expenses of$1,819 per month and income of only
$1,748 per month, leaving her with a deficit of $71 per month. 98 The court
determined that Rose's monthly expenses were not excessive, and as a result,
Rose could not maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay the
student loans.9 9 The court concluded that, based on her current income and
expenses, the first prong of the test was satisfied.'Oo
In determining whether the situation was likely to persist for a significant
portion of the loan repayment period,'' the court turned to Rose's family
situation to satisfy the second element. 0 2 Rose's husband, Michael, was
currently unemployed and stayed at home to take care of the couple's two

91. Id. at 760-61.
92. Id. at 761. The court noted that MSLP had filed its claim in hopes of having
it declared nondischargeable, and therefore it must accept that the court would declare
it dischargeable. Id.
93. Id. at 762.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1994).

95. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 763 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997) (citing Andrews v. South Dakota Student Loan Assistance Corp., 661
F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Dotson-Cannon, 206 B.R. 530, 533 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1997)).
96. Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying text..
97. This is the first prong of the Brunnertest. See supranote 18 and accompanying
text.

98. In re Rose, 215 B.R. at 763.
99. Id. at 764.
100. Id.
101. This is the second prong of the Brunner test. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
102. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 764 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997).
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children. 3 Any income he could potentially earn would be offset by the cost of
child care. 1°4 Because the couple's youngest child was born during the pendency
of the case, the court determined that Michael Rose was likely to remain
unemployed for six more years.0 5
The court reasoned that because the typical repayment period is ten years,
once Michael returned to work, he and Rose would have to repay $100,000 in
student loans in four years."° The court also noted that it was unlikely that Rose
would obtain a higher paying job. 0 7 Based on these facts, the court concluded
that Rose would be unable to maintain a minimal standard of living for her
family and repay the student loans for a period of ten years, the totality of the
typical repayment period for student loans.' Therefore, the second prong of the
test had been satisfied. 0 9
In determining whether Rose had made good faith efforts to repay the
student loans," 0 the court looked at Rose's "efforts to obtain a well-paying job,
maximize income, and minimize expenses," as well as attempts to repay the
student loans."' The court noted that Jennifer Rose had made reasonable efforts
to get the best job she could." 2 The court also noted that Rose's expenses were
minimal, and repaying the student loans was impossible because the couple

already had a monthly deficit, excluding any loan payment.1 3 Although Rose
had not made any payments on the loans, she had researched the possibility of
loan consolidation or increasing payment plans! 14 Based on these facts, the
court concluded that the good faith prong of the Brunner test had been satisfied

and the debts were dischargeable under Section 523(a)(8)(B)."'

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.

106. Id. at 765. The court also noted that because of its earlier ruling declaring a
$6,360 debt to the University of Missouri nondischargeable, that amount, plus interest,
would also be due. Id.
107. Id. The court based this conclusion on the current market for new attorneys
and, in a scathing comment, noted that based on Rose's presentation of the case, the court

"consider[ed] it unlikely that she will obtain more lucrative employment in the
foreseeable future." Id.
108. Id.

109. Id.
110. This is the third prong of the Brunner test. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
111. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 765 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1997).
112. Id.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 766.
115. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/14
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V. COMMENT

A. State Sovereign Immunity
In finding that Congress's Article I powers did not trump the Eleventh
Amendment and that 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) was unconstitutional,

16

the Bankruptcy

Court for the Western District of Missouri strictly applied the test put forth by
the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe." 7 The court also followed the growing
trend among bankruptcy courts to find a waiver of sovereign immunity where the
state has filed a bankruptcy claim."' The result was to mesh together new
thoughts on the limits to which Congress can expand the powers of the judiciary
through Article I of the Constitution with long-standing case law" 9 regarding
waiver and jurisdiction.
While the reasoning is sound, the court did not have to reach the
constitutional issue to resolve the case. ° The court, like others faced with the
issue,12 ' could have noted the constitutional question and determined that
because MSLP had filed a claim, it had waived its sovereign immunity. The
court could have exercised judicial restraint and still obtained jurisdiction to hear
the matter without declaring Section 106(b) unconstitutional. However, the
court decided that Congress cannot declare by2 statute that filing a claim in
bankruptcy is a waiver of sovereign immunity.1
116. There may be some question as to whether addressing the constitutional issue
was necessary given that MSLP had filed a claim. See infra note 118 and the
accompanying text.
117. Like the Seminole Tribe Court, which did not address whether the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to waive a state's sovereign immunity under the
Indian Commerce Clause, the Rose court did not determine whether Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to enact 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (1994).
Other courts have rejected this argument in this context. For the reasoning behind these
rejections, see In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d 237, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1998).
118. See supra note 34.
119. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573-574 (1947).

120. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacatedon othergrounds
sub norn. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). "[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds one involving a constitutional question, and the other, a question of statutory
construction or general law, the court should decide on the basis of the latter." Id. at 227.
121. See In re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225, 229-30 (D.P.R. 1996) (determining that
constitutional issue need not be addressed because Section 106(b) did not apply in that
the Department of the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico did not file a claim
in the proceeding); In re Koehler, 204 B.R. 210,219 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997) (stating that
it did not have to reach the constitutional issues related to Section 106(b) because the
state did not file a claim); In re Lazar, 200 B.R. 358, 378-79 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding that the state had filed a claim and had waived its sovereign immunity, thereby
sidestepping the broader constitutional issue).
122. Underlying this is a fundamental separation ofpowers issue. The inquiry into
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Perhaps a paradoxical aspect of the case is the practical rule created by the
Rose court: if a state entity does not want a student loan discharged, it should
do nothing. If it files a claim, it has waived sovereign immunity and the claim
can be discharged. The best tactic is to wait until the debtor files a complaint to
determine the dischargeability of the loans and then file a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.12 3 The result is that the loan is not
dischargeable, regardless of the exceptions found in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)
or (B).
The effect of such a rule is that debtors in bankruptcy with student loans are
not afforded all the protections Congress intended. The "fresh start" is a strong
policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code. Debtors should be allowed to discharge
debts within defined limitations. Here, Congress limited the exceptions in 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) to loans first coming due seven years before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition and to loans that would impose an undue hardship on the
debtor if they were not discharged.12 4 The rule from In re Rose adds a
controlling qualification to the two limitations: the debt will be discharged only
if the debtor's bankruptcy court can obtain jurisdiction over the state agency
holding the loans.
Because subject matter jurisdiction was addressed by first finding Section
106(b) unconstitutional and then finding a waiver by MSLP through the filing
of a claim, the Rose court created a rule that has ramifications outside of the
student loan context. For example, prior to Rose, when the state contended that
a debt was not dischargeable because of fraud, larceny, or embezzlement,' the
state had to file a claim and prove that the debt should not be discharged for that
reason. The claim would then constitute a waiver of the state's sovereign
immunity under Section 106(b). Now, the state need not file a claim, but can
move for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'2 6 The state will be
able to side-step the requirement that it establish that the debt was due to fraud,
larceny, or embezzlement, and the debt will not be discharged. 7 The state is

whether "Congress cannot dictate to the judiciary the standard for assessing whether a
state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. This begins and ends as a matter of
constitutional interpretation." In re NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 839 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1997). See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
123. This was the tactic successfully used by the University of Missouri. See Rose
v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).'
124. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1994). See supra note 5.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1994).
126. The primary difference between the proposed scenario and the fact pattern of
In re Rose is that to discharge student loans, the debtor carries the burden of proof and
to have a fraud, embezzlement or larceny debt declared nondischargeable, the creditor
carries the burden of proof.
127. Clearly, a court could rely on the reasoning that if the state wants the
protection of the bankruptcy court, it will avail itself of the court's jurisdiction.
However, with the protection of the Eleventh Amendment trumping the Bankruptcy
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/14
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the status of a "supercreditor," enjoying rights other creditors
thereby elevated
28 to
have.'
not
do
Judicial interpretations subsequent to the Supreme Court's Seminole Tribe
holding have created an uneven application of the nation's bankruptcy laws. If
a federal court cannot obtain subject matter jurisdiction over a claim because of
sovereign immunity, a debtor may be forced to bring suit in state court.' 29 This
would add cost and difficulty to obtaining discharge of a debt owed to the
state. 3' Ultimately, as the court delineated the parameters of Congress's power,
it eroded the rights granted to bankrupt debtors.
Ironically, while the court made it harder to get jurisdiction over claims
involving a state, it possibly made it easier to get a discharge of student loans.
In each of the four reported cases decided on the basis of undue hardship in the
Western District of Missouri since 1994, the court has granted a discharge of
32
student loans.' Often the debtors were sympathetic, unemployed,
underemployed, 33 or disabled. 34 In In re Rose, however, Jennifer Rose was
employed as a law clerk making $30,000 a year. 135 Her husband voluntarily
decided not to work. 36 Based on the circumstances of the case, Rose and her
husband were much better situated to repay the student loans than the other
debtors that came before the court after 1994.

Code, the state may not need the court's protection to prevent a debt from being
discharged. Because there is no subject matter jurisdiction, the court cannot rule on the
matter.
128. Steven M. Richman used the term "supercreditor" to describe the status states
have when they are not bound by bankruptcy court proceedings. See Steven M.
Richman, More Equal than Others: State Sovereign Immunity Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 603, 604 (1990).
129. One court when addressing the constitutionality of Section 106(a), decided
that it does not unconstitutionally compel a state to submit to the jurisdiction of a federal
forum. In re O'Brien, 216 B.R. 731, 738 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998). Even so, the court

dismissed the case against the state, noting that the state had concurrent jurisdiction to
determine the issue and the debtor could bring suit in state court. Id.
130. One commentator has suggested three possible solutions to the dilemma

created by Seminole Tribe in the bankruptcy courts. Justin V.Switzer, Did They Really
Think This Over: Seminole Tribe v. Florida and the Bankruptcy Code, 34 Hous. L. REv
1243, 1269-76 (1997). Among the possible alternatives identified include suing the state
in state court, letting the federal government sue the states, and vesting the estate in the

United States. Id.
131. See supra notes 57-76 and the accompanying text.

132. In re Clevenger, 212 B.R. 139 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 199.7).
133. In re Dotson-Cannon, 206 B.R. 530 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).

134. In re O'Brien, 165 B.R. 456 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
135. Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 763 (Bankr.

W.D. Mo. 1997).
136. Id. at 764.
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The case illustrates the amorphous nature ofthe Brunner test. Where facts
and circumstances indicate to the court that a discharge is warranted, the test is
flexible enough for the court to satisfy its three prongs. It is no longer a test, but
merely a framework for analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Jennifer Rose obtained a discharge of more than $105,000 in
student loans, the effect of her case could serve to limit the dischargeability of
student loans and other claims by the state in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Missouri. In re Rose has created a rule where the state wins
in bankruptcy by doing no more than filing a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Ironically, as the court elevated the status of debts
owed to the state above other creditors, it lowered the hurdle for discharging
student loans.
ICHAEL C. STOFFREGEN
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